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Security Interests in Personal Property. GRANT GILMORE. Boston: Lit-
tie, Brown & Company, 1965. 2 vols. Pp. xxxiv, 1508. $45.00.
This is an excellent and important work, the recipient of the Ames
Prize for a "meritorious" book awarded by the faculty of the Harvard
Law School, and the most significant and authoritative commentary on
the Uniform Commercial Code that has yet appeared. Article 9 on
Secured Transactions is by all odds the part of the Code which has had
the greatest impact on the legal profession, and Professor Gilmore was
its principal draftsman. It is therefore pleasant for a fellow laborer to
be able to report that the commentary is solidly competent and some-
times brilliant, and that it is faithful to the spirit of the sponsors of
the Code who employed him as reporter.
Unlike its principal competitor, Secured Transactions under the
Uniform Commercial Code,1 the work is not a collection of separate
essays. Although portions appeared earlier in legal periodicals, they
have been integrated into a coherent whole, designed more for refer-
ence than for straight reading in cold blood. Yet despite the complex
and technical subject matter, a lucid style is maintained throughout,
sometimes sprightly almost to the point of insouciance.
The first 286 pages, as the preface explains, consist of "a survey,
largely historical," of pre-Code law. The survey is justified as a por-
trayal of the state of mind of the draftsmen, or at least of the principal
draftsman; much of it is repeated, summarized, or incorporated by
reference in the subsequent discussion of the Code. The history is in-
evitably impressionistic rather than exhaustive, but it goes beyond the
prefatory justification, perhaps because of the author's "own fondness
for writing history." Sometimes a completion urge also seems to be at
work: the discussion of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, for example,
includes six pages of very close analysis of two hypothetical cases. The
.UTRA has now been superseded in all but four of the states which
enacted it. "No reported cases have yet been found dealing with" the
first case; "No one seems yet to have suggested" the second.2
The balance of the work consists of explanation of article 9 of the
Code and of analysis of the issues it presents. The discussion covers
every significant issue under article 9 which has come to my attention.
It includes some issues which I do not believe exist; sometimes the
author seems to have a similar belief. The discussion always illumi-
nates; some issues are exhausted, others disposed of summarily. Though
1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1963).
2 § 4.7 at 111 nn.5 & 6.
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others no doubt will disagree, I believe that Professor Gilmore deals
fairly even with those points on which he and I differ; the level of
candor is unusually high. The discussion is not confined strictly to the
Code, but ranges over such related topics as competing federal stat-
utes, automobile certificate of title acts, subordination agreements and
negative pledge clauses, circular priority systems, federal tax liens, and
bankruptcy problems. The defense of the controversial section 9-108
against the attacks of bankruptcy buffs3 requires particular mention:
it is brilliant advocacy, although I do not subscribe to all that is said.
This brings me to what is in some ways the most fascinating aspect
of the work, the conflict between the roles of draftsman and commen-
tator. At one pole the draftsman-commentator is an oracle: Karl Llew-
ellyn used to argue that the judicial impact of Williston on Sales as an
exposition of the Uniform Sales Act was "no pleasant anomaly in a
legal system which has not hitherto taken pleasure in the delegation to
private persons of essentially legislative power." 4 At the opposite pole
is a violation of the principle that a lawyer should not attack the va-
lidity or effect of his own work.5 Professor Gilmore's preface discloses
the problem: "It should be remembered that the anonymous 'drafts-
man,' whose shortcomings I exhibit, was not infrequently myself."
6
As that sentence suggests, he purports to write in his capacity as dis-
interested academic observer, not to present the official views of the
sponsoring organizations: "I have tried to strike a balance between
what seem to me to be the real accomplishments of'the Code and the
occasional defects which mar it.''7
Such detachment, coupled with a style which is distinctly not orac-
ular and with candid disclosure of the points at which he departs from
organized consensus, should be and probably will be sufficient to pre-
vent the work from being treated as retroactive legislative history. As
I have indicated, I find candor in full measure. Others among the hun-
dreds who have worked on the Code and who have experienced the
rejection of particular proposals may resent Professor Gilmore's publi-
cation of his dissents, but eternal loyalty to majority decisions on con-
troverted points would be an unwise and unworkable requirement. In
my opinion his criticisms stay well within the bounds permissible for
loyal participants in a collective enterprise.
When an author assumes the Olympian role of detached critic of his
3 § 45.6.
4 See REMIsD UNIFORM SAmS Aar 49 (1941).
5 See DRINKER, LxcAL ETHrcs 113-14 (1953).
6 P. x.
7 Ibid.
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own work, the reader naturally looks for traces of unconscious bias as
well. A draftsman for a group effort must learn to accommodate points
of view different from his own and to accept editorial improvements
gracefully, but he is likely to be less than completely happy when he
yields as well as when he is outvoted. Sometimes he is wise to yield
even though the improvement does not really improve the draft. As
the project develops, however, his views tend to harden, for in a project
as intricately interwoven as the Code, change becomes progressively
harder to accommodate. At some point the job must be finished and
frozen, at least temporarily, and as that point approaches changes must
be resisted more and more vigorously. Thus the later the change, the
greater the pain of the draftsman.
In the drafting of article 9, Professor Gilmore had much greater
control of the process leading up to the 1952 Draft than in the revi-
sions made in 1956 and subsequently. One would therefore expect him
to think that a good many of the later changes, particularly those ac-
companied by the phrase "rewritten for clarity," were on balance un-
fortunate. And so, indeed, it turns out. This is not the place for a full
catalogue of the points at which the reviewer disagrees with the author
on points of law or policy, but it seems appropriate to give an illustra-
tion or two of the psychological process I have described.
Lapse and circular priority. Section 9-103(3) of the Code provides
for certain cases where collateral is brought into the state which enacts
the Code. In such cases "the security interest continues perfected in
this state for four months"; if perfected in this state after the expira-
tion of the four month period "perfection dates from the time of per-
fection in this state." The comment says that after four months the
security interest "is subject to defeat here by those persons who take
priority over an unperfected security interest (see Section 9-301). Un-
der Section 9-312(5) the holder of a perfected security interest is such
a person even though during the four month period the conflicting
interest was junior. Compare the situation arising under Section 9-
403(2) when a filing lapses."
Section 9-403(2) provides for "lapse" of a filed financing statement
five years after the date of filing; "Upon such lapse the security inter-
est becomes unperfected." The comment substantially repeats the com-
ment to section 9-103 quoted above, and adds an illustration to make
it clear that a junior security interest becomes entitled to priority when
a senior interest becomes unperfected by lapse. The comment adds:
"This rule avoids the circular priority which arose under some prior
statutes, under which A was subordinate to the debtor's trustee in
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bankruptcy, A retained priority over B, and B's interest was valid
against the trustee in bankruptcy. In re Andrews, 172 F.2d 996 (7th
Cir. 1949)."
In Professor Gilmore's section 21.6 on lapse, the comments quoted
above are "discussed, disapproved and disavowed." 8 The 1952 draft of
section 9403(2) had been clear the other way, like the decision in the
Andrews case. "Conceivably" the change in the text of the Code in
1956 "was merely a typist's or typesetter's error"; 9 Professor Gilmore,
though "in general responsible for preparing the Article 9 Comments,"
is "not responsible" for the language here criticized and "is, indeed,
unaware of its origins."'10
In the Andrews case the contestants were two chattel mortgagees
and a trustee in bankruptcy. A failed to refile, but the court gave him
first claim; the money came out of the pocket of B, originally the junior
mortgagee, whose only fault was failure to search the record; the trustee
in bankruptcy took everything above the amount of B's claim. In reach-
ing this result, says Professor Gilmore, the court "sensibly" broke out
of the circle; "as the Andrews case shows, solutions to circular systems,
when they do arise, are not hard to come by."'" In chapter 39 on cir-
cular priority systems, however, after a review of "these appalling com-
plexities" without reference to the lapse problem, he expresses doubt
as to the utility of an attempt to "approximate the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties,"' 2 instead, we should follow what courts, or at
least some of them, have actually done in recent decisions, on the
ground that "experience... solves more problems than logic."' 3
As one who participated in the 1956 deliberations on the Code, I
find this treatment of the lapse question unsatisfying. My recollection
is that most of the members of the responsible subcommittee were far
less cheerful than Professor Gilmore now is about the prospect of cir-
cular priority, and that the revisions in question are two examples of
great pains taken to eliminate circular priorities. I believe I supplied
the Andrews citation after the subcommittee had settled the policy; I
know I have always regarded the Andrews decision as a botch. How-
ever that may be, Professor Gilmore's attempt to make the 1956 text
mean what the 1952 text said, contrary to the comment, involves him
in a chain of reasoning about "knowledge" and "constructive notice"
8 § 22.8 at 627 n.7.
9 § 21.6 at 589 n.4.
10 Ibid.
11 § 21.6 at 589.
12 § 39.2 at 1032.
13 § 39.4 at 1045.
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which does violence to the Code's definitions and the statutory text.
One is tempted to quote his own language on another point: "On any
decent principles of statutory construction it is, to say the least, harder
[though apparently desirable] to see how the... provision can be thus
cheerfully construed away .... ,14 Compare his apparent recommen-
dation of "latitudinarian disingenuity" on another point.15
Fixtures. Section 9-313 on priority of security interests in fixtures
was also generally rewritten in 1956. The 1952 draft seemed to say
that a seller could retain a security interest in the cement foundation
of a building and on default remove the foundation, subject to an
obligation to "reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the realty
other than the debtor for the cost of repair of any physical injury."
According to Professor Gilmore, "It was the thought of the draftsmen
that coupling the right to remove with the duty to reimburse effectively
limited the subsection (1) priority. . "..,' The revising subcommittee
was apparently able to visualize cases of malicious creditors or conse-
quential damage where the duty to reimburse for repair of physical
injury would not be a sufficient limitation. In any event, to Professor
Gilmore's distress, a new sentence was inserted to make it clear that
there can be no removal of structural materials which become an in-
tegral part of the real estate. He argues ably that the new sentence
should be read in accord with its wording and its purpose, and should
not be read as introducing unintended complexities. Unfortunately his
argument is weakened by observations which seem simply to express
pride of authorship. An illustration is his conclusion "that the 1956
revisions of § 9-313 can, if approached in a cheerful spirit, be con-
strued to have left the main lines of the relatively satisfactory 1952
draft unchanged.' 17
A similar reaction was provoked by another change in the same sec-
tion. The 1952 draft denied priority to an unperfected fixture interest
as against subsequent advances by a prior encumbrancer of the realty
made without knowledge of the fixture interest and before its perfec-
tion. In accord with the general policy of section 9-312 of conditioning
special priorities on the taking of appropriate steps to perfect, the 1956
draft limited the denial of priority to cases where the prior encum-
brance is "of record." Professor Gilmore denounces the change as "an
unexplained addition" which "makes no sense at all.' 8 A second 1956
14 § 21.7 at 593.
15 § 31.5.
16 § 30.2 at 805-06.
17 § 30.3 at 814.
18 § 30.6 at 828.
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change extended the denial of priority to cases where the subsequent
advance was "contracted for" without knowledge of the fixture interest
and before perfection. In Professor Gilmore's book this too is "an un-
explained addition"; he conducts an extraordinary argument with him-
self as to what it means:
(1) Perhaps a future advance clause means that any subsequent ad-
vance whatever is "contracted for."1 9 (2) "The revisers must have been
thinking of" so-called "obligatory" future advance arrangements. 20
(3) But "obligatory" advances could rarely be compelled once the en-
cumbrancer learns of the fixture interest.21 (4) Priority "surely" should
not rest "merely" on advances "contracted for" before the fixture in-
terest attached.22 (5) "On grounds of policy, it can be reasonably argued
that" priority should be given to advances "made without knowledge
of the fixture interest."23 (6) Two pages later: "It would not be im-
possible for courts to use 'contracted for' in such a way as to re-estab-
lish the vague but real priority which the construction mortgagee,
under different guises, enjoyed at common law. ' 24 (7) "An astute and
sensitive court might manipulate 'contracted for' in such a way as to
do only good, while avoiding evil." 25 (8) Nearly 100 pages later, in the
chapter on future advances: "[I]t is nonsense, at least on the conceptual
level, to make a distinction between obligatory and voluntary ad-
vances. ' 26 (9) Finally, where a Code security interest conflicts with an
earlier filed Code security interest: "There is no explicit language in
any of the sections which have been discussed which make (sic) knowl-
edge or notice relevant." 27 A good faith limitation may be implied,
but "there is no bad faith in A's continuing to make contemplated
advances, related to the original financing transaction, even though
he knows of intervening liens or security interests." 28
With deference, it is suggested that Professor Gilmore's reasoning
last quoted is equally applicable to the analogous fixture problem, and
that his confusion stems largely from reluctance to give a literal and
sympathetic reading to statutory language inserted by someone else.
Section 9-313 makes reference to the prior encumbrancer's knowledge
19 Id. at 829.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 831.
25 Id. at 832.
26 § 35.4 at 926.
27 § 35.7 at 942.
28 Ibid.
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at the time his subsequent advance is "contracted for," but makes no
reference to subsequent knowledge or notice. A "good faith" limita-
tion is not merely implied; it is explicit in section 1-203. But there is
no bad faith in continuing to make contemplated advances, related to
the original financing transaction, even with knowledge of an interven-
ing fixture interest. The fixture party is not left helpless: since the
prior encumbrancer must be "of record," the fixture party has an op-
portunity to discover his peril.
The foregoing does not of course exhaust the points at which the
reviewer balked, or even those which illustrate the thesis that any
draftsman worth his salt will have a bias in favor of his own work which
may survive the most intensive self-analysis and self-criticism and may
show through to the informed reader of self-commentary. But a book
review should not be a treatise, and I must content myself with brief
mention of some of the undelivered comments from which I suffer:
Commingled goods. (1) It is not true that "perfected" in the first
line of section 9-315(1) "in context, can only mean perfected by fil-
ing. '29 (2) The comment to the same subsection does not suggest "that
paragraph (b) is limited to cases where 'components are assembled into
a machine,' "30 any more than it suggests that paragraph (a) is limited
to cases of "cake mix or cake." (3) Section 9-313(1) does not have any
"apparent meaning" at all with respect to unperfected security inter-
ests. It is strictly limited by its opening clause to cases where "a security
interest in goods was perfected." Professor Gilmore's contrary reading
is an example of his addiction to negative implications, which appears
more than once. "All men are mortal" does not mean that all other
animals are immortal.
Statutory liens. The "unexplained appearance of the possessory lan-
guage in the 1956 draft"31 of section 9-310 is easily explained by sec-
tion 67c of the Bankruptcy Act,32 the Quaker City Uniform case,33 and
the unreasoning prejudice of the revisers against circular priorities,
referred to above. Professor Gilmore neglects section 67(c)(2) of the
Bankrtaptcy Act, which is somewhat more drastic than section 67(c)(1),
which he does discuss. In this instance we are told unnecessarily that
a provision for possessory liens "does not lead inevitably" to a negative
29 § 31.4 at 846.
30 Id. at 848.
31 § 33.5 at 888.
32 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1964).
33 In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
1030 (1956).
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implication with respect to nonpossessory liens.3 4 The Massachusetts
omission to which he refers35 was corrected by amendment in 1958.
"For no apparent reason," it is said, the carrier's lien is given priority
while the warehouseman's lien is not; Professor Gilmore then explains
the reasons, quoting the sponsors' published exposition of the 1956
changes.3 6
Knowledge and priority. Section 9-312(5) lays down a first-to-file rule
of priority and a first-to-perfect rule, without any reference to "knowl-
edge." This contrasts sharply with section 9-301, giving rights to "a
person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected." As indicated above, Professor Gil-
more sometimes seems to assume that both provisions mean what they
say. But the priority rules were entirely rewritten in 1956; it is, of
course, "less than crystal clear" that the apparent meaning was intended
and deliberate.37 In his direct discussion of the point he mixes up argu-
ments as to policy with arguments as to interpretation until he is able
to find a "puzzling situation." He then treats "good faith" and "knowl-
edge" as interchangeable, in defiance of the Code definitions, and con-
cludes, "a reasonable man might be swayed by either of these argu-
ments," without indicating whether he is talking about a reasonable
legislator or a reasonable judge. 38 I would agree as to the legislator, but
not as to the judge.
Resale after default. Professor Gilmore concludes that proper notice
and a "commercially reasonable" sale are conditions precedent to the
recovery of a deficiency.3 9 The Permanent Editorial Board created by
the sponsors of the Code urged a contrary view in an amicus brief in
the case of Norton v. National Bank of Commerce,40 and the decision,
rendered after Professor Gilmore had gone to press, accepted our view
on this point.
Bankruptcy. I have already indicated my admiration for Professor
Gilmore's defense of section 9-108. Sorrowfully, however, I must report
another negative implication. Section 9-108 describes two types of
transfers of after-acquired property to a secured party, providing that
the security interest "shall be deemed to be taken for new value and
not as security for an antecedent debt." "By necessary implication,"
34 § 33.5 at 888.
35 Id. at 888 nA.
36 § 33.6 at 890.
37 3 84.2 at 898.
38 Id. at 898-902.
39 § 44.09.
40 398 S.W.2d 538 (Ark. 1966).
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says Professor Gilmore, "after-acquired property interests of any other
type are, as a matter of state law, antecedent debt transfers. ' 4 1 Not so,
any more than it is implied that transfers of property not after-
acquired, or transfers to one who is not a secured party are necessarily
antecedent debt transfers. Indeed, two pages further on, Professor Gil-
more refers to a type of transfer which may or may not fall within the
two types described in section 9-108: the substitution of new collateral
for old collateral of equivalent value.42 Here he forgets his "necessary
implication" and makes no suggestion that section 9-108 seeks to re-
verse the pre-Code cases holding such transfers not preferential.
Enough has been said to demonstrate that the reviewer read the
work. Read it with respect, and with interest and profit. It remains
only to repeat what was said at the outset: the work is important, and
it is well done. It is not as unreliable as an oracle, but one can pick a
nit or two if one tries. The discussion makes adequate disclosure when
it stands on shaky ground; with all faults, it will be hard to surpass.
For the present, this is the one indispensable treatise for a lawyer who
advises on Code security interests.
ROBERT BRAUCHER*
41 § 45.6 at 1313.
42 Id. at 1315.
* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
Lawyers in the Making.1 SEYMOUR WARKOV & JOSEPH ZELAN. Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1965. Pp. xxii, 180. $5.00.
Would you like to know the difference between the mean LSAT
(Law School Admission Test) score of salesmen's sons who contem-
plated law study in 1961 and the mean LSAT score of like-minded
farmers' sons? If so, I can tell you: one point. The farmers' sons lead
the salesmen's sons, 508 to 507.2
Can you guess how many Jewish lawyers' sons with high scores on the
API (Academic Performance Index) preferred a career in medicine as
compared to equally high-scoring Catholic and 1rotestant lawyers'
sons? Probably not. The answer is 18% as against 12% for the talented
scions of the other two faiths. 3
1 The book, a joint publication of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) and
the American Bar Foundation, is included in the NORC's Monographs in Social Research.
2 P. 21, table 1.16.
3 P. 49, table 3.7.
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